JONES v.CLINTON AND PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
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On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones set in motion events that could
alter the legal status of the office of the President of the United States. Ms.
Jones filed a lawsuit against William Jefferson Clinton, the sitting
President, because of sexual improprieties he allegedly committed while
serving as Governor of Arkansas. 370 As of January 1996, the case had
already worked its way up the judicial ladder from the trial court to the
first appellate level. Jones v. Clinton is poised to come before the United
States Supreme Court, which could address unexplored areas of
presidential jurisprudence--the body of legal theory and doctrine that deals
with the Chief Executive.
The suit itself has not yet been tried. No jury has been impanelled, and
no attorney has placed the President on the witness stand. Currently, the
courts are wrangling over procedural matters rather than substantive ones.
Nevertheless, the particular procedural issue in this case is important in its
own right: whether a sitting president may be sued for acts committed
before he assumed office. The watershed case in this area of "presidential
immunity" is Nixon v. Fitzgerald,in which the Supreme Court decided
that President Richard Nixon was not subject to lawsuits over matters
connected with the execution of the duties of his office. 371 This paper
examines the interaction of the Fitzgerald decision, the presidential
immunity issue as raised in Jones v. Clinton, and the judicial philosophy
of the current Supreme Court. As the twenty-first century approaches, Ms.
Jones' suit will have an impact on the Office of the President that will no
doubt reverberate throughout both the legal and political worlds.

Nixon v. Fitzgeraldand Presidential Immunity
In November 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, an Air Force management
analyst, testified before a congressional subcommittee that certain
aerospace developmental projects would engender cost overruns of nearly
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two billion dollars.3 72 In January 1970, Mr. Fitzgerald's job was eliminated
during a putative cost-cutting reorganization. 37 However, Mr. Fitzgerald
believed his superiors fired him in retaliation for his testimony before
Congress, thereby violating federal civil service regulations, and he filed
suit against several
executive branch officials, including--eventually-374
President Nixon.
By the time Nixon was named as a defendant in 1978, he was no
longer a sitting president; nevertheless, he argued that the doctrine of
"presidential immunity" operated to bar his inclusion as a defendant. 375 In
an opinion written by Justice Powell,3 76 the Supreme Court engaged in a
lengthy analysis of the evolution of governmental immunity. 377 The
Supreme Court had previously held that government officials enjoy
absolute immunity from common law actions for damages based upon
their official acts. 378 Subsequent decisions extended the immunity doctrine
to shield state officials acting within their official capacities from actions
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 37 9 Eventually, the Supreme
372 Id. at 734.

The Supreme Court opinion, in footnote one, directs the reader to
Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 199-201

(1968-1969).

373 Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 734.
374 Id. at 739. Fitzgerald's dismissal caught the attention of both Congress and the
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The subcommittee before which Fitzgerald testified conducted a derivative hearing into
his dismissal (The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense:
hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1969)), which received extensive press coverage.
Following this bad publicity coming in the midst of the unrest surrounding the Vietnam
War, an embattled administration proposed a reassignment of Fitzgerald to another
government position, tentatively in the Bureau of the Budget. See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at
735. However, some administration officials resisted this move. In fact, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield circulated a memo suggesting that the administration "let
[Fitzgerald] bleed" for his remarks. Id. When no other federal employment offers were
forthcoming, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission, which decided in
closed hearings that Fitzgerald was improperly discharged for "purely personal" reasons,
and that he should be reappointed to his position or a comparable one. Id. at 738.
Fitzgerald then filed the suit referenced in the text of this article, which eventually named
Nixon as a defendant after more than eight years of procedural battles similar to those at
issue in Jones. Id. at 740.
375 Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 741.
376 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring

and White, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun,

J.,
dissenting).
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Id. at 744-49.
3 78
Id. at 744 (explaining Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), in which the Court held
the Postmaster General enjoyed absolute immunity from civil damages actions in the
interest of preserving "proper and effective administration of public affairs.").
379 See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 745. Justice Powell discusses Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (holding that, absent evidence of express Congressional legislative
intent, a federal state would not operate to "impinge on a tradition [of immunity] so well
grounded in history and reason," and therefore state legislators would enjoy absolute
immunity under the statute for legislative acts) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)

Court addressed immunity of federal officials from damages for
constitutional violations in Butz v. Economou,380 holding that like state
officials, federal officials generally have a qualified "good faith"
immunity, but that some officials--like prosecutors and judges--enjoy
' 381
absolute immunity due to the "special nature of their responsibilities."
This approach, granting immunity based on particular
functions of an
3 82
approach.
"functional
the
termed
office, has been
In light of this body of case law, the Fitzgerald Court held that the

Chief Executive of the United States enjoys absolute immunity from
damages liability for official acts, even those only within the "outer
perimeter" of official responsibility. 383 In reaching this position, Powell

reasoned that the unique characteristics of the presidential office, as
delineated by the Constitution, 384 prevent application of a "functional
approach" and require recognition of absolute immunity, as opposed to the
qualified immunity extended to state governors and cabinet officers under

Butz.3 85 Powell drew authority for the President's absolute immunity from
the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Whenever the judiciary is
called upon to exercise jurisdiction over another branch of government,
the separation of powers doctrine mandates that courts balance the need to
serve the public interest against the dangers of intrusion on the authority
and functions of the other branch.386 For instance, the Supreme Court
found that the public interest requires the President to submit to the
387
jurisdiction of the judiciary in an ongoing criminal investigation.
Conversely, in Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court concluded that Mr.
Fitzgerald's right to damages under a "merely private" suit, based on the
President's official acts, does not outweigh the danger of intrusion into the

(holding that state judges enjoy absolute immunity from sec. 1983 suits for judicial acts
while police officers enjoy qualified immunity when their official acts are performed in
good faith). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (extending qualified
immunity to state executive officials charged with constitutional rights violations based
upon "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based.").
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authority of the presidential
office. 388 Thus, Fitzgerald's suit against the
389
President was dismissed.

Jones v. Clinton and Presidential Immunity
Paula Jones filed a complaint on May 6, 1994, in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against President
William Clinton and State Trooper Danny Ferguson. The complaint
alleged, inter alia, violations of the federal Civil Rights Act concerning
sexual harassment and conspiracy, as well as state law defamation
claims. 390 Ms. Jones' complaint was based upon an alleged encounter on
May 8, 1991 between herself and then- Governor Clinton in a Little Rock,
Arkansas hotel room during a conference they both attended. 391 By the
time Ms. Jones filed 392
the complaint, Mr. Clinton had been elected President
States.
of the United
President Clinton filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the case on
the grounds of the presidential immunity doctrine concerning private suits
3 93 However, since the acts giving rise
for damages set forth in Fitzgerald.
to Ms. Jones' claims occurred prior to Mr. Clinton's assumption of office,
he tempered his demand for immunity from the absolute grant in
Fitzgerald to immunity from litigation while in office, with potential
reinstatement of the claims after he leaves office. 394 Accordingly, the
district court scheduled a second3 5 oceeding to resolve the threshold issue
of President Clinton's immunity.
After reviewing the arguments of both parties, the district court
produced a lengthy analysis of the immunity doctrine, canvassing the
Magna Carta as well as American constitutional theory. The court
concluded that the case should be put "on hold" until President Clinton
leaves office, though discovery could proceed to ensure the preservation
of evidence. 396 To support its decision, the district court noted that,
388
3 89
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Id. at 758.

390 Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902, 904 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
391 Id.

392 Id. at 903-04.
393
Id. at 904.
394 Id.
395

Id. at 905.
396 Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994). Judge Wright begins her
discussion of presidential immunity with an examination of the limitations placed on the
English throne by the Magna Carta and enlarged by the Petition of Right. Id. at 693.
Judge Wright then chronicles the tention among the framers of the Constitution
concerning the proper role of the executive juxtaposing Roger Sherman's statement that
the "President should be nothing more than an instrument for carrying the will of the
Legislative into effect" with Gouverneur Morris' contention that the President should be

although Fitzgerald was inapposite, the problem facing the President
"[was] essentially the same--the necessity to avoid litigation, which also
might blossom through other unrelated civil actions and which could
conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his
office."397

On January 9, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning and reversed the order
granting the motion to stay the trial and affirming the order permitting
discovery. 398 Writing for the panel, Judge Bowman determined that, since
no presidential immunity of any kind is expressed in the Constitution,
"whatever immunity the President enjoys flows by implication from the
separation of powers doctrine, which itself is not mentioned in the
Constitution, but is reflected in the division of powers among the three
branches." 399 Furthermore, the court of appeals determined that Justice
Powell's discussion of presidential immunity in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
represents the "fundamental authority" on the subject.4 00 Analyzing that
case, the court of appeals reasoned that, by definition, unofficial acts such
as the ones underlying this case are not within the perimeter--not even the
outer perimeter--of the President's official responsibility. Therefore,
immunity is unavailable. 40 1 Circuit Judge Bowman fleshed out this
reasoning by stating that "the very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever [she] receives an injury." 40 2 Ms. Jones retains that right in her
suit against Mr. Clinton, provided she is not challenging
actions that fall
4 03
within the ambit of official presidential responsibility.
The court went on to discount the district court's concern for the
potential intrusion of increased civil litigation in the efficient functioning
of the presidential office. First, the court of appeals stated that the
Fitzgerald Court was troubled by the potential impact of private suits
"the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, against Legislative tyranny." Id.
at 694 (quoting Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Constitution: Article II, in AN AMERICAN
PRIMER 121-22 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1968)). Judge Wright surmises that this tension
partially underlies the Constitution's silence on the issue of immunity from civil suits.
Id. As a result, Judge Wright concludes that "there is nothing in the [Constitution]
relating to civil actions ... [t]hus, the hard fact is that these issues of immunity, whether
absolute or qualified, have been left in the hands of the Judiciary, particularly the
Supreme Court." Id. at 697. With this in mind, Judge Wright distinguishes Fitzgerald
from the instant case since the events here occurred prior to President Clinton's
assumption
of office. Id. at 698.
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at 1360 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).

arising out of President Nixon's performance of his official duties on the
future performance of those duties, not by whether the President as 4an
04
individual citizen would have time to be a defendant in a lawsuit.
Second, the court asserted that prudent judicial case management should
prevent conflicts between litigation and the President's performance of
official duties. Third, the court found that, historically, few civil suits
against presidents have ever been filed, despite the fact that no court has
held that an incumbent president has any immunity from suit for unofficial
actions. 40 5 Finally, the court repudiated the notion that immunity may be
granted on an ad hoc basis where the plaintiff demonstrates no urgent need
for relief; instead, the court held that immunity exists, if at
all, because the
40 6
Constitution--and Fitzgeraldby extension--commands it.
Circuit Judge Ross' dissent affirmed the district court's stay of trial and
would reverse its order allowing discovery to proceed. According to the
dissent, the separation of powers reasoning of Fitzgerald applies with
equal force to the factual situation of Jones, requiring that, absent exigent
circumstances, private actions for damages against a sitting President of
the United States, even though based on unofficial acts, must be stayed
until the completion of the President's term. 407 Any other result, the
dissent argued, would create a separation of powers conflict since it would
require the judiciary to weigh the President's performance of official
presidential acts against the efficient resolution of litigation when setting
trial and hearing dates, thereby intruding upon the performance of those
duties. 4°8 Using the same deference to the separation of powers doctrine,
the dissent would extend the stay to discovery matters as well, reasoning
that "discovery is likely to pose even more intrusive and burdensome
demands9 on the President's time and attention than the eventual trial
,40
itself.
Thus, the court of appeals relied on a rather literal, restrictive reading
of Fitzgerald to deny Mr. Clinton's motion for a stay.410 On the other
hand, the dissent undertook a more flexible approach to Fitzgerald,
arguing that the demands of an efficient government require a grant of
immunity, particularly when only temporary, and
that Fitzgerald may
41 1
analogy.
by
situation
Clinton's
apply to President
404

[d.

4Id.

at 1362.

Circuit Judge Bowman indicates that the parties have only identified
three instances in which sitting presidents have been involved with litigation concerning
their acts outside official duties, none of which involved the type of presidential
immunity at issue here. See id. n. 10.
406

d.

4Id. at 1367 (Ross, J., dissenting).
408
Id. at 1369.
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410 Id. at 1359 (majority opinion).
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The Supreme Court and Separation of Powers
The final arbiter of this presidential immunity question will be the
United States Supreme Court. While retrospective analysis is of somewhat
limited value, a look at the Court's previous positions concerning the
separation of powers doctrine should provide an idea of how the issue may
eventually be resolved in the instant case.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's approach to the separation of
powers doctrine has been characterized as "muddled. '412 In the last few
decades, the Court has vacillated between formalist and functionalist
approaches to the doctrine. 413 Under the formalist approach, the Court
emphasizes strict adherence to the textual separation of powers found in
the Constitution and rejects any argument that a blending of powers would
serve a practical need that the original structure was unable to serve.414
Under this "rule of law" approach, any attempt by one branch to perform
duties traditionally reserved for another is per se unconstitutional.415 On
the other hand, a functionalist approach tends to be more pragmatic and
evolutionary, 416 assuming that some commingling of functions may occur
as long as no excessive--as
determined by the Court-- encroachment or
417
aggrandizement results.
In Fitzgerald,both Justice Powell's plurality and Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence focus on a separation of powers analysis to determine
availability of immunity. 418 In the case at bar, the Supreme Court will
likely be asked to determine if extension of presidential immunity to nonofficial acts is appropriate. If so, the Court will look again to the
separation of powers analysis used in Fitzgerald.
Although the Court has followed a functionalist approach in the last
decade, recent cases have shown a formalist shift. 419 On the current Court,
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FunctionalApproaches to Separation of Powers Questions -A Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 489-91 (1987)).
414 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
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68 CORNELL L. REv. 236, 243 (1983).
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Justice Scalia is a staunch supporter of the formalist approach.4 2 0 He has
written that the Court should "not treat the Constitution as though it were
no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches
should not be commingled too much--how much is too much to be
determined, case-by-case, by this Court" and that there should be no
"improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of a currently
perceived utility."42 ' In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,422 Scalia wrote a
formalist decision for a seven to two majority holding that Congress
violated the separation of powers doctrine by commanding courts to
reopen final judgments in securities fraud cases. 3 Since in Plaut there
was only a rule-based inquiry into whether the branches of government
remain distinct, 424 Scalia and the formalist majority now on the Bench
would likely support the rule set forth in Fitzgerald,which sets the Chief
Executive outside the ambit of the judicial branch while engaged in
official duties.
Nevertheless, simply because Powell's decision in Fitzgerald meshes
with Scalia's perspective on separation of powers--and based on the 1995
voting alignments, probably that of most of the sitting Justices 425 --there is
no guarantee that the currently non-activist Court will extend the
presidential immunity of Fitzgerald to the facts of Jones. A formalist
approach to Jones would probably follow the Eighth Circuit opinion by
Judge Bowman, particularly the language stating that "whatever immunity
the President enjoys flows by implication from the separation of powers
doctrine ...

[and the Supreme] Court's struggle in Fitzgeraldto establish

presidential immunity for acts within the outer perimeter of official
responsibility belies the notion ... that beyond this outer perimeter there
is still more immunity waiting to be discovered. ,426 Thus, judicial scrutiny

of acts of the President outside the outer perimeter of official duties would
not offend the separation of powers theory and, consequently, would not
trigger the protections of presidential immunity. Adoption of the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning by the Supreme Court would preserve the protection
afforded the Chief Executive in Fitzgerald while also safeguarding the
liberties of those whom a president is alleged to have wronged while
acting outside the protected sphere of official duties. As this country
420

421

Id. at 93.
Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426-27 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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, 115 S.Ct. 1147 (1995).
423 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 94 n.126.
424 Leading Cases, supra note 43, at 235.
425 Harvard Law Review's annual analysis of Supreme Court voting patterns gives the
following figures for frequency with which each Justice voted with Scalia in 1995:
Thomas 88.2%; Rehnquist 80.0%; Kennedy 75.3%; O'Connor 68.2%; Souter 60.0%;
Ginsburg 59.5%; Breyer 59.3%; Stevens 45.2%. Table I(B) Voting Alignments, 109
HARv. L. REv. 341 (1995).
426Jones, 72 F.3d at 1359.

moves into the next century, difficult decisions will need to be made
concerning allocation of resources and determination of social priorities.
This tension is evident in Jones v. Clinton, which forces the courts to
balance the public interest in the efficient execution of governmental
functions against an individual's right to seek timely redress through the
legal system. The ultimate resolution of this case, and the public reaction
it engenders, should provide an indication of the direction our judiciary
will take us in the years to come.
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